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Abstract 
 
 
Agribusiness value chains in developing countries have experienced the impact of a double State 
reform process. The first generation of reforms imposed through the Washington Consensus 
aimed at economic stabilization, reduction of State budget deficits, and removal of trade barriers. 
The second generation focuses more on institution building in particular the creation of effective 
and independent regulatory agencies. This process puts institutional change in the foreground and 
therefore faces the resistance of entrenched vested interests. This paper develops the concept of 
quaternary institutions, that is, constitutive institutions for governance and discusses the 
conditions of emergence of new co-ordination rules in agribusiness value chains in developing 
countries that favour the inclusion of smallholders and less powerful stakeholders. A brief review 
of relevant concepts in institutional economics is conducted to clarify the role, the forms and the 
functions of these institutions. It leads to paying special attention to information generation and 
sharing as a crucial factor of institutional change. The role diverse actors such as the State, 
private organisations and external bodies can play in the emergence of quaternary institutions is 
then highlighted. 
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Introduction 
This paper uses the concept of agribusiness value chain (also called supply chain or commodity 
chain) and refers to institutional economics to discuss the transition from State-led to market-led 
agriculture development in developing countries. The concept of agribusiness value chain is used 
to represent, in a national economy, a specific set of actors and activities in relation to a particular 
product. It is not only a heuristic tool that is helpful to understand the complexity and logic of 
interactions between different groups of interest, it is also a structuring approach in the sense that 
in both developed and developing countries, entire subsectors have evolved towards the 
integrated form of a commodity chain (Bourgeois and Herrera 2000).  
 
The wave of structural adjustments promoted by the financial institutions of the Washington 
consensus (the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) during the last 15 years of the 
20th century is characterised by economic stabilization, reduction of State budget deficits, and 
removal of trade barriers. They brought a transition from an administered (or State-led) to a 
market-led economy (Griffon 1999). This general trend also strongly affected commodity chains. 
Inefficiencies in the production and trade of agricultural products within supply chains were 
usually considered as the doing of failing State intervention and induced the withdrawal of the 
State from virtually any type of intervention, including regulation activities. However, mixed 
results and undesirable patterns of market failures appear to spoil the expected efficiency gains. A 
new set of reforms aiming more at the building of a new institutional capacity, in particular the 
creation of new, more efficient and independent regulatory agencies (Marzin, Voituriez & Losch 
2001) was then promoted. A new institution building terminology (decentralization, governance, 
social capital) progressively substituted to the old structural adjustment terminology. 
 
Yet, old problems endure while new problems arise.  Griffon (1999:4-5) highlights that "the 
(liberal) transition is governed by a set of rules, some of which decompose while others 
recompose".  Growth and competitiveness still constitute the paradigmatic objectives in supply 
chains. The co-ordination through prices in transparent markets where informed sellers and 
buyers meet is still the common blueprint of interaction, and the dominant view of economists 
and advisors in global or sector economic policies that affect agriculture and commodity chains. 
In this model where the market is presented as the alternative solution to public administration 
inefficiencies and as the only effective mode of co-ordination for optimal allocation of resources, 
the old prescriptions persist: liberalization through rapid or progressive removal of incentives, 
taxes, and barriers to the production and trading of agricultural products, transformed products 
and inputs; privatization of manufacturing, industrial and commercial enterprises; economic 
stabilization and maintaining the main macro-economic balances. In the supply chains in 
developing countries, these still mean the privatization of State-owned assets, the dismantling of 
the administration of the commodity chain, and the opening up to international trade.  
 
The focus on institution building, especially the creation of new regulatory agencies with the 
purpose of improved governance recognized to some extent that market-led regulation is an 
efficient form of co-ordination only in certain circumstances and that not all agents have the 
capacity for investment, the initial resource endowments, or the access to adequate information to 
create the conditions for a competitive and transparent market. Yet, the creation of new 
regulatory forms that are supposed to deal with market powers meet the same problems it strives 
to eliminate: the existence of entrenched, powerful vested interests.  
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Sudden and drastic changes have thus occurred in commodity chains affecting their functioning, 
the behaviour of their actors, and the former modes of interaction. They show that the 
constitution of efficient competitive and equitable commodity chains can neither result from State 
rules nor from market rules, but from navigation between the reefs of State and Market. 
 
While prices are an important regulating factor and coordinating mechanism between individuals’ 
plans, other factors increasingly explain the success of more efficient value chains such as 
technology, quality, information, and organization (Hugon 1999).  Each of these factors makes 
explicit reference to collective actions and to interdependencies that are not necessarily regulated 
by prices. 
 
Developing countries face a serious challenge in promoting a lasting, profitable agriculture and 
an agro-industry that will benefit all their farmers and entrepreneurs and fit in the national and 
international economy. They have to fight the market powers of specific groups of agents who 
regulate the commodity chains by their control over prices and where existing rules favour short-
term competitiveness, produce negative externalities, progressively or rapidly marginalize 
already deprived or disadvantaged groups such as smallholders.  
 
This problem leads to discussing the emergence of new modes of co-ordination and collective 
control of individual actions without losing the imperatives of economic performance. It is 
sustained by a systemic concept of competitiveness that emphasizes the role of interactions and 
dialogues as a factor of dynamic growth. Bradford (1994) and Hugon (1999) for example argue 
that endowment, strategies and policies are now more important sources of competitive 
advantages than natural resources. The World Bank (1993) also shows that negotiated strategies 
and policies, bringing together those in charge of the public and private sectors played a crucial 
role in the process of growth in East Asia. 
 
The challenge is therefore to ensure that the creation of new institutional forms aiming at the 
establishment and the application of coordination rules in supply chains will effectively reduce 
inequalities and externalities that are produced by government and market failures.  
 
The paper is organised in three sections. In the first section, reference is made to the conceptual 
framework of institutional economics with a specific focus on the emergence, development, and 
operation of constitutive arrangements. Implications for the commodity chains, in particular the 
role of information, are then discussed. In the third section, the respective role of various agents 
in the emergence of such arrangements is discussed. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
Institutions 
Confronted with uncertain situations economic actors apply rules of behaviour. These “… rules of 
the game in a society” are called institutions by North (1990, 3). Institutions reduce the 
uncertainty and provide a structure of reference for decision making in everyday life. They define 
and limit the range of individual choices in the face of innumerable actions. As such they affect 
the economy by their effect on the costs of exchange and production. This section briefly 
introduces some key concepts on institutions and develops some more specific and relevant 
points for the discussion of the emergence of institutions and institutional change. 
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Commons’ definition of an institution as “Collective action in control of individual action” brings 
a useful entry point in the context of supply chain (Commons 1934:69, cited by Neale 1988). It 
emphasizes the relations between actors and the system and it highlights a coordination function 
which purpose is to reach a state that is not the random aggregation of individual and separate 
decisions.  
 
Further relevant developments on institutions include distinctions on their nature and their 
functions/roles. Walliser (1989:341), for instance, distinguishes “procedural” (abstract 
mechanisms of co-ordination, a contract for example) from “organic” (concrete entities charged 
with implementing mechanisms, a Board of Trustees for example) institutions, “regulative” 
(orienting existing behaviour) from “constitutive/generative” (establishing new behaviors) 
institutions, “programmed” (explicit agreement between actors) from “spontaneous” (non-
intentional) institutions. E. Ostrom (1988:120) presents an equally relevant distinction for the 
understanding of transition problems in a commodity chain. She identifies three functional levels: 
(i) operational - the rules that are applied, (ii) collective - how to change the rules, and (iii) 
constitutional, the rules for changing the rules. Parto (2005:37) also elaborates a typology of 
institution where an “associative” type is mentioned as “… facilitating prescribed or privileged 
interactions among different private and public interests”. This typology leads to the recognition 
that institutions are hybrids, and the possibility for associative institutions being first regulative 
and then becoming constitutive is very consistent for the discussion on the emergence of new 
forms of coordination in commodity chains.   
 
Within this framework, the market, and its rules, is considered as an institution aiming at 
organizing exchanges among individuals in relation with a product or a group of products. From 
this perspective, it is not only a tool for the regulation of individual actions, but also a set of 
procedures ensuring co-ordination amongst economic agents. The role and efficiency of the 
market as a resource allocation mechanism have been discussed by economists of the “expanded 
standard theory” through various analytical approaches and concepts such as rent-seeking 
(Krueger 1974), transaction costs3 and opportunistic behaviour (Williamson 1975), asymmetric 
information (Stiglitz 1998), and negative externalities especially on natural resources2. In the 
neo-institutionalism framework, the market is not challenged as the dominant mode of resource 
allocation. It is analyzed in an institutional context that explains why it is unable to provide 
optimum outcomes and fails to fulfil its expected role. 
 
However, for Perroux (1991:315) there is “no market without peace in the market”. He shows 
that "the market is not a mechanism that can be isolated from the institutional environment where 
it was born and were it develops…  Nobody doubts that the concrete, historical market is an 
institution" (Perroux 1991:314-315). Accordingly, even under the assumption of market-ruled co-
ordination, arbitration is necessary to ensure that peace prevails. This arbitration aims at finding 
compatibility between the plans and the projects of unequal groups. It serves the market and 
should not be used to serve oneself. In the transition phase that takes place in agribusiness value 
chains in developing countries, the passage from State-ruled to market-ruled coordination is a 
passage from one form of arbitration to a new one. This step is neither easy nor neutral. Path 
dependence (North 1990), transaction costs, asymmetric information, free riding may limit the 
options. The emergence of new forms of collective action in this context corresponds to the 
creation of programmed new constitutive procedures embedded in organic institutions, according 
to the terminology of Walliser, or institutions that are both collective and constitutional. These 
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institutions will be thereafter called quaternary institutions, in reference to the fact that they serve 
all primary (production), secondary (industry) and tertiary (services) sectors that are constituents 
of a supply chain (Bourgeois, 1999).  
 
The rules for changing the rules: emergence of constitutive arrangements 
In agribusiness value chains, there is always a pre-existing system of relationships governed by 
rules, codes, organizations, routines. This system remains stable as long as actors do not question 
it for technical, cultural, economic, social or political reasons.  Why and how does change occur? 
Institutional economics provides elements of answer for understanding institutional change. 
Authors largely underscore technical change, or the development of technology, related to the 
progress of science as a first source of change (see for instance Veblen, Commons and Ayres 
cited in Fusfeld, 1977:753-754). Changes may also be economically driven either, as indicated by 
Marx, through individual action or as the result of larger transformation towards a market 
economy (see Polanyi in Fusfeld, 1977:768-769). 
 
How change occurs, why at a specific moment and not at another, why in one place and not in 
another? What is the reason for institutional change? Walliser (1989:360) argues that “ (…) an 
institution ends (up) by becoming autonomous to the point where the reasons that brought it into 
being are no longer actually the same as those that make it last, transform or disappear.” In this 
evolutionary context, institutional change is produced when expected benefits outweigh the costs 
(see Coase in Feeny, 1988:163). This implicitly means that the change results in a gain in 
efficiency as detailed by Feeny (1988:180): 
“These sources (of the benefits expected from innovations in institutional arrangements) 
include the capture of capital gains, risk sharing, the achievement of economies of scale, 
the reduction of transaction costs, and the amelioration of incomplete markets, 
externalities and market failure”. 
 
This view of the emergence of institutions is centred on an (often implicit) demand and it 
acknowledges that current arrangements let escaping considerable gains. It would remain 
incomplete without taking into consideration the supply of institutional change. This supply 
depends on the structure of power or the balance of interests between different groups, and is 
conditioned, according to Feeny (1988:183), by a certain number of key factors such as the cost 
of the institutional design and its implementation, existing and conventional knowledge (customs; 
habits), constitutional order, existing arrangements, and the net benefits expected by the dominant 
decision-making elite. 
 
Similarly, in the theory of convention, Boyer and Orléan (1994:222-231) show with non co-
operative games that the passage from one convention to a superior one requires that a certain 
number of stakeholders co-ordinate to change simultaneously their behaviour. Otherwise self-
reinforcement factors would hold the established convention steady. During transitions such as 
those affecting supply chains in developing countries, the game of actors is as important as the 
institutional frame. 
 
The emergence of new rules in agribusiness value chains 
The concept of agribusiness value chain is based on an explicit acknowledgement that interwoven 
relationships, that need to be taken into account to explain observed situations, exist within and 
outside the market. The assumption is that such value chains are not sectors of the national 
 5
economy where individual agents exchange products on the exclusive basis of a bilateral 
relationship determined by prices. The commodity chain is a system of interacting individual and 
collective agents (associations of producers, federations, syndicates, enterprises, public 
administration) and a cluster of co-ordination mechanisms where various institutional 
arrangements ranging from routines and custom-based verbal agreements to formal laws and 
decrees can be found. 
 
Supply chains are subject to considerable processes of change. Actually, structural adjustment 
and posterior reforms induced by international financial authorities, donors, followed by political 
elites, supported by multinational enterprises, and expressed in the rules of the game of 
international commerce are the strongest source of institutional change. The eagerness of 
governments in developing countries to dismantle public administration in commodity chains, to 
withdraw all public intervention, to unilaterally open up to international commerce, to privatize 
businesses and services, and to deregulate clearly witnesses this point. It is also related to a 
dominant free market paradigm that attempts to establish an institutional functioning that passes 
through the implementation of certain principles (less State intervention) and modes of 
organization (more market) preferred to others. Such pressure aims therefore at modifying the 
functioning of value chains in the hope that the dominant mode of regulation will be price 
arbitration. 
 
In the case of the transitions affecting the commodity chain, changes seldom originate from a 
technical innovation to which individuals and organizations must adapt through appropriate 
institutions. They are immediately institutional (as shown by the term “institutional reform” used 
by donors) and lies within the scope of Polanyi’s (1944) logic of the “great transformation”. 
Given the fact that institutional adjustments are slow while practical implementation is rapid, the 
“capture of markets by sectional interests” who benefit from market powers (Hubbard 1997:243) 
is possible. It would then favour short-term competitiveness to the detriment of social justice, 
economic efficiency and sustainable management of natural resources, and lead to the exclusion 
of the less powerful actors such as small scale farmers.  
 
This situation poses a fundamental problem: how is it possible (in terms of capacity and adequate 
time frame) to ensure that an agribusiness value chain includes all actors and that they produce 
the institutions that will permit them to collectively control its evolution? 
 
The application of the concepts presented earlier can provide some elements of answer.  These 
are not normative; they are informative. They are sought to orient the thinking and action of 
analysts, researchers, and decision makers confronted with the pressure for deregulation from 
interest groups, and seek to promote transitions where administered commodity chain becomes 
co-managed rather than handed over to violence, market powers, and opportunistic behavior.   
 
Quaternary institutions and constitutive change 
As indicated earlier, the situations of reference (before adjustment or deregulation) are 
characterized by the existence of institutions that cannot be substituted by others just by simple 
will. Transition does not spontaneously take place, leading to an efficient market-ruled 
agribusiness value chain. It is oriented by the interplay of existing actors and institutions. If 
transition is expected to lead to more efficient forms of organisation of the agribusiness value 
chains, avoiding its capture by powerful groups, the exclusion of smallholders, or the generation 
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of accrued disparities or unwanted externalities, it has to be oriented accordingly.  How can this 
transition be oriented? 
 
A possible answer is to promote a common interest among actors to implement regulative 
changes in the functioning of commodity chains through the building of constitutive 
organizations to ensure that the market, and other institutions, serves the interests of the greatest 
number. As indicated earlier, the terms quaternary institution (or constitutive institutions for 
governance) refer to institutional arrangements aiming at changing co-ordination rules so that the 
plans and strategies of economic agents can be made more compatible in their mutual interest. 
These institutions are primarily organic, constitutive and programmed, operating at the collective 
and constitutional level. Their functions, organisational forms, and factors of emergence are 
discussed thereafter.  
 
Functions 
The main function of a quaternary institution is to overcome government and market failures 
associated with the transition from State-led to market-led rules in agribusiness value chains. 
 
In overcoming market and government failures, quaternary institutions contribute to reduce the 
uncertainty linked to the incompleteness and asymmetry of information and to the dominant 
position of some actors over supply, demand or prices. As such, quaternary institutions reduce 
non-cooperative behaviour of organizations or individuals, protect actors from market from 
violence (fraud, cheating, contraband, exaction) and contribute to resolve conflicts. 
 
In the field of non-market relations they function as constitutive organizations in charge of 
establishing collective rules that are accepted and used by the stakeholders. They also establish 
agreements on the means to exert control and sanction the non respect of the regulative 
agreements. Thus these institutions contribute to improved governance in the commodity chain 
by assuring transparency as a result of the circulation of information and promoting dialogue 
between actors. 
 
Organisational Forms 
As organic institutions, quaternary institutions are embedded in organizational forms. While the 
functions they perform import more than the form they take, certain types of quaternary 
institutions are more efficient or more adapted to specific purpose. These options are discussed 
thereafter on the basis of permanence and organisational complexity.  
 
Non-permanent ad-hoc forms: meetings, forums. Forums or meetings are non-permanent ad-hoc 
quaternary institutions that can be used to promote the emergency of new constitutive 
arrangements. Their purpose is to circulate information, stimulate non market contacts and 
exchanges, and allow for a shared reflection on the basis of raising awareness on current and 
future problems in order to orient decisions and to gradually forge common representations. 
 
Largely open and allowing for great distribution of information, they are rather cheap unless they 
involve a very large number of people with. Their institutional design is simple but fundamental 
conditions for their success include the quality of the organization, the substance of discussions 
and the respect of specific rules in particular in allowing equitable voice to all the participants. 
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Forums and meetings, like policy arenas, may have great executive power. They may also 
contribute to the emergence of more perennial forms of quaternary institutions. 
 
Permanent ad hoc forms: groups, committees, commissions. More permanent ad-hoc forms to 
tackle specific problems allow for conflict resolution, for adjustments in periods of crisis, for 
continuous monitoring of new agreements, and for orienting policies. Arbitration and decisions 
have considerably greater power, particularly if they operate in presence of high-level decision 
makers. However, these are not usually appropriate forms for exerting control and enforcing 
rules. 
 
To be truly functional, they compel more restricted participation and this can in turn result into 
representation problems for certain categories of actors, generally the most dominated and most 
significant in number. If no consideration is made for outward relays, information distribution 
will be limited and therefore of little use. The success of an ad hoc permanent organisation 
depends by and large on how representative the participants are and on the content of information 
used for negotiation and decision. 
 
Permanent Bodies:  inter profession, grouping, federation, offices. The more permanent and 
complex organisational forms are inter profession, federation, or offices. They differ from the 
apparently similar forms of constitutive institutions for governance dismantled in the deregulation 
and liberalization process of formerly State-administered commodity chains because they are 
independent from State intervention, or at least, the State is but one of the stakeholders among 
others. They do not emerge from the State’s willingness to regulate the supply chain but from 
stakeholders’ willingness to act collectively in defence or promotion of common and shared 
interests, through policy orientation and decision, investment decisions, information, 
establishment of rules, norms, and contracts. Interests of all parties are represented. They are 
bestowed with arbitration and supervision powers, and significant political power. Their 
institutional design can be complex, their establishment and functioning costly in terms of time 
and money. There is also a possible risk to see their functions being diverted to serve lobbies or 
interest groups.  
 
Factors of emergence 
As discussed earlier new institutional forms emerge when a number of criteria are met: 
expectation of greater efficiency (gains), a sufficiently large number of actors who have a stake in 
the change, the net expected benefits of the elite and dominant decision makers, existing 
knowledge, the cost of the institutional design and the cost of its implementation, constitutional 
order, existing arrangements, and conventional knowledge.  These different elements provide the 
analytical frame for discussing the emergence of quaternary discussion sin commodity chain. 
 
Expected benefits. The perception that the opportunity for substantial gains is lost is one of the 
factors mentioned by the theory of institutional change that can explain the passage to new 
arrangements.  In commodity chains, this perception is not always present due to a lack of 
adequate information on the current loss of potential earnings. There are cultural barriers such as 
language and education, physical barriers such as remoteness as well as socio-economic reasons, 
such as the strategy of specific actors who limit or divert the circulation of information for their 
own benefit, which may explain why some actors do not have access to this information. 
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The creation of quaternary institutions is strongly linked to the possibility of raising awareness 
that the current functioning does not or no longer respond to needs and objectives, or does not 
allow for preparation for future changes. Beyond the conception of new institutional economics 
where information is an instrument for making the market more efficient through greater 
transparency, information is considered here as a key factor for institutional transformation of 
commodity chains because of the knowledge it brings in regard to the expected gains for all the 
actors of change, as Melody (1987:369) argues, “…effective regulation requires information with 
respect to the potential implications of various reform possibilities…”  
 
Communication of information is also crucial because it modifies the pattern of interactions that 
constitute the essence of institutions (Melody 1987). The circulation and highlighting of the 
shared benefits9 to be gained from establishing new institutional arrangements will for instance 
increase the number of actors with a stake in change and their power. As Marwell and Oliver 
(1993) stress in the theory of critical mass and collective action, the more numerous and diverse 
the actors, the easier the initiation of the dynamics of institutional change. At least three types of 
information whose circulation could significantly help or contribute to the establishment of new 
institutional constitutive arrangements can be identified: 1) information about competitiveness 
and efficiency of a commodity chain and its prospects, 2) the analysis of current functioning and 
obstacles to change, and 3) an anticipation of the new forms of functioning and the modes of 
establishment. The last point particularly refers to knowledge about constitutive rules, their role 
and importance.  
 
The emergence of constitutive rules that will permit new actors to take part in the management of 
a supply chain implies a shift in the functioning of existing interactions among stakeholders. 
Thus, the net benefits expected by the dominant elite and decision-makers cannot be ignored. The 
structures of power in place and particularly the relationships between politics and the economy 
must be taken into account and integrated in the analysis of the situation. As Perroux (1991:315) 
explains, collusion between the “Prince” and the “Merchant” leads to the market serving oneself 
and not one to serving the market.  
 
The Cost of Change. The cost of institutional design and the cost of putting it into operation must 
be compatible with the expected efficiency gains.  Inexpensive systems of co-ordination will be 
preferred for instance when the commodity chains are not yet organized or are newly operating, 
or when their absolute economic or social contribution (added value, food security) is still low. 
Conversely, more costly and permanent forms will be required for more commodity chains that 
weight both in terms of their complexity, history and in terms of their economic and social role 
(for example, for traditional export products or main staple food). 
 
Hodgson (2006) highlights that some institutions and in particular coordination rules are self 
organizing and therefore depend less on other institutions for the enforcement of their internal 
rules. Reciprocally, changing coordination rules would require the action of other institutions to 
overcome the inertia that is created at individual level through habits (Hodgson 2004) and the 
related institutions these habits contribute to establih. This point will be further developed in the 
next section. 
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The Creation of Quaternary Institutions 
 
Three types of actors can be at the origin of the creation of quaternary institutions to enable the 
emergence of new regulatory institutions in a commodity chain: the State, private-sector 
organizations, and bodies that are external to the commodity chain. There role is respectively 
discussed thereafter. 
 
The States 
Deregulation and the dismantling of State-owned or –led entreprises in commodity chains do not 
lead, as we have seen, by the means of an uncontrolled laissez-faire system, to the establishment 
of a free and competitive market allowing for the optimal allocation of resources. However, real 
criticisms expressed against State administration of commodity chains are mostly legitimate 
because they refer to situations where the State is not an abstract entity working for the good of 
all but a power serving particular interests.  In this sense, the debate over the role of the State is 
not or is no longer over the “less” or the “more” but over the “better”.  
 
How can be conceived the role of the State in the creation of quaternary institutions? 
Fundamentally, the State is responsible for ensuring coherence between macro-economic 
objectives and the strategies of autonomous businesses. A commodity chain being a cut-out of the 
economy corresponding to a sole sector of activity, State representation within the commodity 
chain is necessary to ensure at least that investment decisions made by the economic agents are 
taken into account in the management of public affairs. Actually, the role of the State goes 
beyond that of being an observer of decisions whose effects could be incompatible, or even 
adverse, to decisions made in other sectors of the national economy. 
 
Thus the State/Market dichotomy must be replaced by a range of possibilities modulated 
according to circumstances (Christy 1996:1146). The State still has, at least, two functions that 
are connected with the creation of quaternary institutions compatible with the orientations of the 
current paradigm: facilitating constitutive changes and performing governance activities. 
 
State intervention in commodity chains can be considered as legitimate if it contributes to i) 
establish a legal framework and its application (contracts, norms, quality), ii) propose and finance 
in part the new institutional design, iii) facilitate the establishment of an agreement on the 
management of a commodity chain that will reduce uncertainty and allow decisions to be made 
and iv) promote the emergence of organizations that will participate in the management of the 
commodity chain. 
 
In performing governance functions, the State may play to acceptable roles. The first one is the 
reconciliation of the interests of different segments of the agribusiness value chain in the name of 
national interests, through the organizations of meetings or through intermediation by “offices” 
generating and circulating information. The second one is the provision of arbitration in conflicts 
between organizations and interest groups. 
 
These two functions are consistent with the basic principles of the Principal/Agent theory, where 
the State establishes new game rules, associated with the functioning of the market, enabling 
economic agents’ interactions and decisions towards increasing collective welfare Gintis (1993:8-
14). The Principal/Agent problem that appears here between the State and the private sector and 
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among State organizations is the hold that a mandated interest group could gain on the economic 
development of a commodity chain. This problem can be solved by the establishment of 
quaternary institutions capable of arbitration. But as underlined by Perroux, this is equally a 
question of the legitimacy of the role of the State. Acknowledgement of its competence as 
regards legislation is a basic requirement and one must pay careful attention to collusion between 
economic and political powers in the promotion of a new institutional arrangements. 
 
The Private Sector 
Two cases must be distinguished according to the presence or absence of an existing inter- 
organizational arrangements. 
 
In absence of such arrangements, when some groups perceive a common interest to modify the 
existing rules they may take the initiative to create a force for change. It is however difficult to 
put in place new constitutive institutions for governance without the agreement of other actors. 
Therefore, the way the process takes place is of utmost importance. As highlighted elsewhere 
(Bourgeois and Herrera, 2000) the promotion of dialogue and convincing other actors on the 
basis of documented and objective arguments as to the soundness or the need for the proposed 
changes is a key factor.  
 
Still, other actors may suspect a manipulation of information by the groups interested in 
promoting these changes. In this case, resorting to some State arbitration or support, provided that 
it is not seen as collusion, or to a neutral agency, can reduce this risk. 
 
When an organized structure already represents the interests of the stakeholders in a commodity 
chain, this structure may manage the major part of the functions of constitution and of 
governance described above. Its fundamental task is to facilitate dialogue between organizations 
and individuals representing the interests of the different segments of the commodity chain in the 
pursuit of a common interest. 
 
Even so, this type of structure may be also subject to pressures resulting from the institutional 
context where the commodity chain itself developed and can constitute an obstacle to institutional 
change. This happens for instance when representation is poor, or when it has been cqptured by a 
dominant group and its vested interests. This is the case when processing industries or importing 
wholesalers who have room to play with raw materials or finished products, in national or 
international markets, use such an organization to manage differential tariffs in the trade of goods 
to the detriment of producers without this liberty.   
 
Alternative intermediation 
The third case is the intermediation by external bodies, serving as catalysts for institutional 
change and the emergence of quaternary institutions. The bodies of bilateral or international co-
operation can play for instance an important role in this domain and present a certain number of 
advantages. These are, in particular: economic neutrality due to the absence, a priori, of short 
term economic interests in the transition, political neutrality, orientation toward greater 
democracy, the search for development balanced between management of natural resources, 
productivity and redistribution, the capacity to analyze, generate and circulate information, the 
possibility of transferring and adapting knowledge and experience. 
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Risks exist nonetheless: neither political neutrality nor economic disinterests are guaranteed; their 
understanding of socio-cultural specificities can be weak and there can be the tendency to 
propose standardized or ideology driven models that may not operate. 
 
This external intermediation is, strictly speaking, not a form of quaternary institutions but an 
incentive form for the emergence of new constitutional agreements. However, production and 
communication of information, technical and financial support and sharing of experience can 
largely contribute to the emergence of quaternary institutions if they show the interest of 
institutional change, propose modes of functioning that are legitimate for all actors, and support 
the functioning of new arrangements in their early stage. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the 1980s market-led coordination was actively promoted by the Bretton Woods organizations. 
The latter highlighted and used the failures of State intervention to justify structural adjustment 
policies. Mixed results led to a reorientation of the paradigm towards more institutional building 
and the creation of independent regulatory agencies. Yet, these do not satisfactorily overcome 
dysfunctions in the commodity chains due to both market and State failures. However, the 
emphasis on governance and the needed change of the rules of the game bring on the forefront of 
the debate the question of institutional change in commodity chains and in particular the creation 
of constitutive institutions that can modify the rules of operation of such commodity chains and 
promote the inclusion of all stakeholders. 
 
This article uses the framework of institutional economics and highlights both the necessity to 
struggle against the imperfections of the market and to promote non market forms of co-
ordination aiming at reducing the uncertainty that surrounds individual action and collective 
choices. It emphasizes the role of information as a factor of institutional change and the creation 
of quaternary institutions, or constitutive institutions for governance, as a means of institutional 
change.  
 
The creation of quaternary institutions depends on the pre-existing inter-organizational 
arrangements in the commodity chain, and can result from State intervention in its recognized 
role of institution building, from private sector initiative or from external or third-party 
intermediation. 
 
Quaternary institutions share some common characteristics that bring them close to the 
“institutional approach to economic policy” synthesised by Petr (1984:4). They are value-driven 
and process-oriented, as they aim at the attainment of accepted and shared human values and 
focus on transformation, interaction, and movement not on a static equilibrium. They are 
evolutionary and holistic since the arrangements and measures that can be proposed are not 
permanent and they take into account the diversity of interests and the stakeholders and indicators 
of all natures. They are also non dogmatic and democratic, avoiding immutable truths, dogmas, 
and absolute laws and operating through the control exercised by their members.  
 
Further work is needed to expand the reflection on the emergence of democratic and effective 
forms of regulation in the commodity chains. This is a key issue of governance and regulation 
and one of the 21st century’s work yards for development economists (Yusuf and Stiglitz, 2002). 
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